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Abstract 
A facility wide security system cannot be tested without causing disruption or creating vulnerabilities within the 
system. To overcome this issue, individual components or equipment may be evaluated to a priori performance 
standard. The two common approaches to security equipment evaluations are vulnerability attacks and 
laboratory testing. Laboratory testing of security equipment can reduce the costs and time associated with 
evaluations, as well as limiting the subjectivity of the tests. Vulnerability attacks will produce more realistic 
evaluation results of the whole security system; nevertheless, the data obtained is dependent on the physical 
attributes and skill of the attackers. 
 
This study ascertained what methodology, namely laboratory testing or vulnerability testing, was the most 
effective. To achieve this, both testing methodologies were applied to security padlocks with expert validation. 
The study confirmed that if security equipment has been laboratory tested to a designed priori performance 
level, the degree of security vulnerability can be effectively identified. As the security padlocks demonstrated, the 
high level achieved in the laboratory tests correlated with a high delay factor in vulnerability testing. Such an 
approach to security equipment testing resulted in a reliable and valid quantitative data set that could be 
applied at a later stage to other similar equipment. Nevertheless, it is suggested that when considering a facility 
wide security system, some degree of both laboratory and vulnerability testing has to be applied as they are 
complimentary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of novel security measures is a well-documented field; however, research often overlooks the 
deployment of such security measures. The effectiveness of a security measure in meeting its objectives should 
be understood and documented in order for protective security measures to be better designed, applied and 
managed. Security equipment evaluations are carried out on a variety of technologies, using many different 
methodologies. Government departments, commercial organisations and academic institutions all conduct 
security equipment evaluations to varying degrees and using a variety of methods. 
 
Two of the most common security evaluation methodologies are laboratory testing and vulnerability testing. 
Laboratory testing or simulated methods can reduce the impact of financial costs and time constraints associated 
with security equipment evaluations. Vulnerability testing or adversary attacks will produce more realistic 
evaluation results, but the data obtained is dependent on the physical attributes and skills of the attackers. Each 
method of evaluation has many advantages and disadvantages, and this study seeks to explore the relationships 
between each method. 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Security equipment testing and evaluation have been an important element for the treatment of security risks 
(Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 20). A risk management plan is disadvantaged if the effectiveness of the risk mitigating 
measures are unknown. Security assessment theories—such as critical path analysis—require quantitative data 
from evaluation results, which leads to a more effective security system. 
 
In general, the level of evaluation applied to security equipment focuses on electronic or detection devices. Such 
an approach are attributed to a number of factors, including the on-going development of the base technology, 
the repeatability of tests and the relative safety of the evaluations; however, the evaluation of physical security 
equipment is a less documented field. The tools and skills required for evaluations of physical security 
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equipment makes them restrictive to undertake. Issues of cost and safety also limit the application of such 
evaluations. The destructive testing of physical security equipment is under-reported, perhaps in part due to the 
large outlays required to achieve scientific and statistical accuracy. In addition, evaluation groups who conduct 
physical security tests rarely publish results in the open source domain, as clients may require a level of 
confidentiality with the test results or equipment vulnerabilities. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study was to: 
 
 Conduct applied laboratory testing of security equipment 
 Conduct applied vulnerability testing of security equipment 
 Compare and contrast testing methods and results 
 Define what testing methodology achieves the most effective security evaluation result 
 
There are numerous advantages of using a security equipment testing and evaluation framework, with a 
methodical and analytical process (Jones & Smith, 2005). Nevertheless, published scientific results that validate 
the proposed approach should support testing models. In addition, evaluations should be valid and reliable in 
evaluating the effectiveness of security equipment (Wassell, 1999, p. 90). 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Academic studies often overlook applied security measures, whilst focusing on developing security 
technologies. The effectiveness of a security measures in meeting its objectives needs to be understood and 
documented in order to efficiently design and manage protective security measures. Approaches to assess the 
effectiveness of security controls may include: 
 
 Estimating the efficiency and weaknesses of the security system against the threats 
 A Red team style of mock attack exercises against generic threat types 
 Simulated target analysis against specific threat methods 
 A US military CARVER method (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 65) 
 
In general, security equipment evaluations are conducted infrequently, with minimal consideration of validity 
and reliability. The relative immaturity of the supporting science means that most evaluations are only conducted 
by government authorities that have the appropriate funding; however, there are some additional commercial and 
academic institutes completing security equipment evaluations. In addition, almost all of these conducted 
evaluations centre on a defined standard or criterion. 
 
Government evaluation 
 
Many government bodies conduct evaluations on security equipment. A variety of methodologies, criteria and 
theories are used. In Australia, the Security Construction and Equipment Committee (SCEC) is an 
interdepartmental committee of government that oversees the evaluation and approval of security equipment 
across whole-of-government (ASIO, 2006, p. 1). ASIO T4 Protective Security tests protective security products 
to determine their suitability for use in Australian government facilities on behalf of SCEC. Such testing 
involves validating claims made by the manufacturers, assessing suitability for specific applications and 
identifying any limitations or vulnerabilities (ASIO, 2009, p. 1). 
 
The United Kingdom’s Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) evaluates many types of security 
equipment to ensure that they are suitable for use by the UK government and critical infrastructure (Armstrong, 
2005, p. 1). HOSDB conducts both scientific and attack tests, and significant work has been undertaken in the 
field of perimeter intrusion detection (PIDS) systems (Tarr, Leach, & Branch, 1998, p. 196). The UK Centre for 
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) also manages a research and evaluation program into science 
and technologies aimed at improving the security of national infrastructure, including physical, personnel and 
electronic security (CPNI, 2009, p. 1). 
 
In the United States, Sandia National Laboratories has been conducting research and security evaluations for 
over 30 years on behalf of the US Government’s Department of Energy (Garcia, 2001, p. 1). Evaluations of 
protective security systems are undertaken to ensure the integrity of US nuclear assets and research is conducted 
to support many aspects of the US administration (Sandia Corporation, 2009, p. 1). For non-government 
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organisations, there is often minimal guidance on the application of protective security measures. In addition, 
there is also reliance placed on manufacturers’ claims, third-party security consultants and other forms of 
empirical evidence. Nevertheless, as government guidance is developed and disseminated, such knowledge will 
define what measures are practicable and effective (Claber, 1998b, p. 73). 
 
Commercial and academic evaluation 
 
Governments may lead the way with security equipment evaluations; nevertheless, some commercial and 
academic entities have realised gains through evaluating security products within their own facilities or in 
partnership with government institutions. Senstar Stellar, a manufacturer of security equipment, operates the 
Sensor Integrated Test Environment in Ottowa, Canada. Their facility is used for the evaluation and 
development of Senstar Stellar’s own products (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 30; Maki, Hill, & Malone, 1999, p. 
113). South West Microwave have also conducted security equipment evaluations, in conjunction with the US 
Corrective Services (Harman, 1998, p. 150). The Gryffin TALOS taut wire PIDS was evaluated by the 
manufacturer in a laboratory style environment using computer simulations, interfaced directly to the sensor 
device (Hellard, 1998, p. 209). 
 
Security equipment evaluations are undertaken by some academic institutions. As with commercial evaluations, 
these activities are often completed in conjunction with government or private enterprise. The Security Systems 
Research and Testing Laboratory (SSRTL) at Edith Cowan University, Western Australia, commenced 
evaluations in 2004 and has since completed work with intelligent CCTV systems, biometric devices (Brooks, 
2009), development of testing procedures, and integrated evaluation and risk analysis models (Smith, 2005, p. 
4). One such model is the Jones and Smith Model of Security Equipment Testing and Evaluation, which 
combines risk management principles with scientific evaluations for security equipment (Jones & Smith, 2005, 
p. 32). Another approach from the same laboratory is the defeat evaluation methodology used to evaluate an 
“insider” vulnerability with biometric access systems (Brooks, 2009). The Southwest Surety Institute is a 
partnership between Sandia National Laboratories and several universities in the United States. Evaluations 
conducted by this group include assessment of protective security systems, PIDS, computer modelling of 
equipment performance and blast mitigation measures (Garcia, 1998, p. 232). 
 
Recently, a new form of vulnerability testing has emerged via the internet community. For example, the 
Locksport community exploits many locking devices with their results disseminated through such mediums as 
YouTube and conferences, such as DEFCON in the USA (shadowswan, 2006). 
 
Standards 
 
Standards currently used in the evaluation of physical security equipment include locking devices, barriers, 
building elements, security containers, glazing and ballistic resistant elements. Standards may be considered 
“published documents setting out specifications and procedures designed to ensure products, services and 
systems are safe, reliable and consistently perform” (Standards Australia, n.d., p. 2). Such an approach ensures 
that a common language is achieved within industry, driven by the more progressive parts of industry, 
legislation and community expectations. 
 
One such organisation that develops and propagates security standards is Standards Australia. Standards 
Australia is Australia’s peak standards organisation, although they are a public company limited by guarantee. 
The organisation is charged by the Australian Commonwealth Government to provide general oversight and 
governance of Australian Standards (Standards Australia, n.d.). Their four key areas of focus include national 
and international coordination, accreditation of other organisations to produce standards, development and 
update of standards, and design assessment (Standards Australia, 2009). 
 
Standards used for security equipment evaluation can include both the method of testing and/or the classification 
of products based upon the test results (Claber, 1998a, p. 70). Some standards for physical security equipment 
include, but are not limited to: 
 
 Australian Standard AS4145-2002 Locksets 
 Loss Prevention Council LPS1175 
 Sold Secure SS 304 
 Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) Physical Barrier Attack Standard 
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THEORY SUPPORTING THE STUDY 
 
A facility wide security system cannot be exhaustively analysed without causing widespread disruption or 
creating vulnerabilities during testing. For this reason, the evaluation of individual components to a performance 
standard is necessary. If a security system is found to be ineffective through evaluations of its individual 
components, then vulnerabilities within the system may be identified (Garcia, 2001, pp. 5-6). However, security 
equipment evaluations can be a costly and time-consuming process. Therefore, it is important that evaluation 
data can be transferred and compared between different categories of security equipment (Armstrong & Peile, 
2005, p. 1). To achieve this outcome, rigorous quantitative evaluations are required for security systems that 
protect assets with a significant national or community consequence (Garcia, 2001, p. 241). In addition, on-
going evaluation of security equipment by independent sources will overcome industry issues of poor quality 
purchases and installations (Paget, 1998, p. 201). 
 
Computer simulations of real life sequences to some types of security equipment, most notably detection 
devices, can be applied. Although these methods will quicken research and development opportunities, they are 
not a true substitute to vulnerability tests in real life situations (Hellard, 1998, p. 209). Evaluations and standards 
should be based upon the principles of impartiality, objectivity, reproducibility (precision when the evaluation is 
reproduced by other parties), reliability, validity and accuracy (Armstrong & Peile, 2005, p. 1). Nevertheless, 
threat sources are flexible and frequently alter attack methods due to installation of security measures (Claber, 
1998b, p. 73). For this reason, evaluations should also be extended to the human element of a protective security 
system, such as the efficacy of x-ray screening operators at an airport or the speed of an on-site response force to 
an alarm activation (Klock, 2005, p. 1). 
 
APPROACHES TO EQUIPMENT EVALUATION 
 
It is important that evaluation and standards for security equipment is specific enough to cover possible variables 
of the technology, achieved through a number of evaluation methodologies (Armstrong & Peile, 2005, p. 2). The 
performance of element’s in a protective security system, whether fulfilling deterrence, detection, delay or 
response functions cannot be truly verified without a one hundred percent end-to-end test. If such an approach is 
taken, entropic decay has already been introduced into the security system (Coole & Brooks, 2009). 
Nevertheless, end-to-end evaluation when installing and operating a protective security system is not considered 
because of financial and time constraints (Brown, 1998, p. 225). 
 
In-field testing 
 
There are four different types of in-field testing, namely pre-delivery testing, contractors field-testing, 
performance verification testing and endurance testing. Pre-delivery testing describes evaluation of a protective 
security system element that is conducted prior to its installation, usually undertaken by the equipment 
manufacturer. Such testing can verify the performance of individual components of the equipment, as well as 
overall effectiveness. Contractors field testing is most often conducted by the manufacturer or retailer of the 
product, with a series of tests to verify performance requirements once site installed (Brown, 1998, p. 227). 
 
Performance verification testing—similar to the vulnerability testing undertaken in this study—should 
completely evaluate all components of the security equipment to their limits. A thorough on-site evaluation of 
the equipment by the owner will confirm that contractual obligations have been met by the installer, as well 
contribution to vulnerability and security risk assessments (Brown, 1998, p. 228). If simulated due to constraints, 
vulnerability testing should replicate real world conditions as closely as possible (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 24). 
 
Endurance testing relates closely with the outcomes of performance verification testing. Although this type of 
testing is most applicable to electronic detection devices in a protective security system, it can also evaluate 
some types of equipment that provides physical delay. Longitudinal analysis of false acceptance rate (FAR) for a 
detection system, or cyclic testing, would be examples of endurance testing (Brown, 1998, p. 228). Not all 
aspects of on-site testing are applicable to the complete protective security system. To test many physical 
elements against expected attacks would be impractical in both time and cost; however, some assurance of 
equipment performance against real life attacks will always be required (Brown, 1998, p. 229). 
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Jones and Smith Model 
 
The Jones and Smith Model of Security Equipment Testing and Evaluation, intrinsically links the security risk 
management process with that of equipment evaluation. Following the threat assessment and risk identification 
stages of security risk management, requirements for the performance of security equipment should be drafted 
by the risk owner (Standards Australia, 2006, p. 70). Such an approach proceeds two levels of security 
equipment evaluation, with level 1 testing within a controlled laboratory environment. Level 2 is a simulated 
vulnerability testing that should replicate real-world conditions as closely as possible (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 
24). The information from both stages of testing feeds back into the risk process, with consideration of expected 
threats. 
 
Vulnerability and laboratory testing 
 
It can be seen that two common approaches to security equipment evaluations are laboratory testing and 
vulnerability attacks. Laboratory testing or ‘simulated methods’ can reduce the impact of financial costs and time 
constraints associated with security equipment evaluations. This form of evaluation also limits the subjectivity of 
the tests (Armstrong & Peile, 2005, p. 3). Vulnerability attacks will produce more realistic evaluation results, 
nevertheless, the data obtained is dependent on the physical attributes and skills of the attackers (Armstrong & 
Peile, 2005, p. 3). One example of simulated real-life conditions is the use of an on-site test to evaluate PIDS 
performance. By using a calibrated impact device at pre-determined points on a fence, scientific and repeatable 
results can be obtained from equipment installed in a protective security system (Leach & Horner, 1997, p. 25). 
 
The effectiveness of security equipment in specific applications cannot be determined by manufacturer sourced 
information alone. The equipment must be evaluated by unbiased groups to obtain accurate evaluation data 
(Paget, 1998, p. 204). The lack of a scientific approach to evaluate security equipment will only provide crude 
results and the ability to make approximate decisions (Williams, Berentsen, & Rexfort, 1999, p. 95). 
 
THE STUDY 
 
The study attempted to ascertain what methodology, namely laboratory testing or vulnerability testing, was the 
most effective within the context of this study. To achieve this, both methods were applied to a number of 
security padlocks and measures taken. The study applied a staged process, where pre and post expert interviews 
were carried out following or proceeding physical laboratory and vulnerability testing (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Study design 
 
The structured interviews were conducted with security equipment evaluation experts to ascertain the most 
efficient and safest way of conducting the vulnerability and laboratory testing. Then, in accordance with the 
Australian Standard, laboratory testing of the padlock shackles demonstrated the resistance of the shackles to a 
bolt-cutter style attack. These results were compared and contrasted with those of the vulnerability testing, where 
the shackles were tested in as close to real life condition as possible. Repetition of both laboratory testing and 
vulnerability attacks offered a much more accurate and valid set of results obtained (Armstrong, 2005, p. 3). 
Such an approach allowed data collection in a reliable and valid manner, and then be compared to an established 
Australian Standards AS4145.4:2002. Finally, the results of both data sets were subjected to expert opinion 
PILOT 
STUDY 
PRE-TESTING 
INTERVIEWS 
VULNERBILITY 
TESTING 
LABORATORY 
TESTING 
ANAYSIS POST-TESTING 
INTERVIEWS 
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through structured interviews. These interviews assessed validity, reliability and the perceived relationship 
between laboratory and vulnerability testing. To ensure that no commercial impact resulted from publication of 
the performance data, the padlocks used for this study were referred to as Padlock A and B. 
 
Evaluation of a security padlocks 
 
A performance measure for any delaying security control is the time needed to defeat the measure (Garcia, 
2001). The measure of delay effectiveness is the time that an attacker requires to bypass each element of delay. 
However, any delay provided by security controls prior to detection is of minimal benefit as it does not assist the 
response force in interdicting the intruder (Garcia, 2001, p. 7). Therefore, the evaluation of physical barriers are 
required to determine the overall effectiveness of a protective security system. 
 
Padlocks and chains are inherently susceptible to physical attack. If possible, padlocks and chains should be 
avoided as a means of securing assets; however, there are some products that will provide larger delay against 
manipulation and physical attack (ASIO, 2006, p. 15). A common attack method against padlocks and chains is 
the use of bolt cutters or croppers, with the resistance of padlock shackles to this attack may be evaluated in 
AS4145.4. This Australian Standard may be applied in measuring security padlocks effectiveness, as it stipulates 
that when testing the resistance of the padlock shackle to cutting attacks, a force meter should be used in 
conjunction with specially designed test jaws. The jaws should be made from general tool steel with a hardness 
of 60-62 Rockwell Steel Hardness (HRC). The dimensions of the jaws should form a 1.5mm flat point, then 
taper away at 60° to a width of 14mm (Standards Australia, 2002, p. 22). 
 
In AS4145.4 ten physical security grades (SP) are employed for padlocks, ranging from the lowest SP1 
resistance to attack to the greatest SP10. These grades are defined, in part, by 14 categories such as minimum 
number of effective key differs, minimum number of effective combinations, resistance to force on cylinder plug 
or locking mechanism, resistance to pulling, resistance to cutting of shackle, resistance to drilling of padlock 
body, shackle and staple, etc., (Standards Australia, 2002). 
 
Laboratory testing 
 
The methodology for the laboratory testing was developed through Australian Standard AS4145.4 and 
discussions with security equipment evaluation experts. The padlocks were evaluated using a cutting jig (Figure 
2). A compressive extension test applied pressure to the cutting jaws and onto the padlock, until one of the end 
of test parameters occurred. These parameters were a 30% change in the applied force or a preset extension that 
stopped the jaws from damaging themselves after crushing through the padlock shackle. To minimise costs 
associated with the testing, only one padlock was sourced for each sample set. After each conducted test, the 
shackle was removed and catalogued, and a new shackle installed into the padlock and repeated 30 times for 
each sample set. 
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Figure 2: Padlock shackle testing jig with padlock shackle 
 
Padlock A 
The laboratory testing for Padlock A resulted in a mean value of 39.13kN (SD 2.17kN) obtained from thirty 
repetitions (Graphs 1 and 2). This measure was equivalent to physical security grade SP7 in the Australian 
Standard AS4145.4:2002 (Standards Australia, 2002, p. 20). 
 
 
Graph 1: Padlock A, repletion tests 1 to15 
 
 
Graph 2: Padlock A, repletion tests 16 to 30 
Padlock B 
The laboratory testing for Padlock B resulted in a mean value of 50.03kN (SD 2.62kN) obtained from thirty 
repetitions (Graphs 3 and 4). This measure was equivalent to SP8 in the Australian Standard AS4145.4:2002 
(Standards Australia, 2002, p. 20). 
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Graph 3: Padlock B, repletion tests 1 to 15 
 
Graph 4: Padlock B, repletion tests 16 to 30 
Vulnerability testing 
 
The vulnerability tests obtained quantitative data on the resistance of the padlock shackle to bolt cutter attacks. 
The padlock shackles were subjected to bolt cutter attacks in simulated real life conditions. The defeat times 
achieved in the vulnerability attacks may have been dependent upon the strength and skills of the attacker 
(Armstrong, 2005, p. 4). For this reason, there was a session for attackers to familiarise themselves with the tools 
and attempt a few practise attacks. This vulnerability stage of testing used a bench mounted vice and 750mm 
bolt cutters (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Vulnerability testing toolset, with 750mm bolt cutters on right. 
 
The padlocks were attached to a chain and the chain was placed into the bench mounted vice (Figure 4). Each 
attempt at a cutting attack was made with the 750mm bolt cutters, with results observed, timed and recorded. 
 
 
Figure 4: Padlock shackle vulnerability test setup 
 
For vulnerability testing, one sample from each set was tested alternatively. Padlock A resulted in a mean value 
of 5.91sec (SD 1.66sec) obtained from four repetitions. The testing for Padlock B resulted in a mean value of 
10.03sec (SD 4.13sec) obtained from four repetitions. Whilst attempting the fifth Padlock B repetition (the ninth 
total repetition) the bolt cutters sustained damage that stopped further testing. 
 
As more attacks were undertaken, the attackers’ technique and speed improved for both sets of padlock shackles 
(Graphs 5 and 6). If further testing were possible, it is foreseeable that this improvement would continue to some 
degree. Comments from participants in both sets of interviews listed fatigue as a variable in the vulnerability 
testing. 
 
 
Graph 5: Vulnerability testing results (Sample sets) 
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 Graph 6: Vulnerability testing results (combined results of both padlocks) 
Expert interviews on testing 
 
The expert opinions had a tendency to focus on the difficulties and variables experienced with security 
equipment evaluations. These difficulties were demonstrated through the literature on the subject and the data 
obtained. Garcia stated that a facility wide security system cannot be exhaustively analysed without causing 
widespread disruption or creating vulnerabilities during testing (2001, p. 5). If a security system is found to be 
ineffective through evaluations of its individual components, then vulnerabilities within the system can be 
identified (Garcia, 2001, p. 6). The restrictive time and costs associated with some security equipment 
evaluations are documented in the literature (Armstrong & Peile, 2005). The laboratory and vulnerability testing 
mirrored these themes, as it was difficult to conduct highly accurate or destructive testing on the padlocks if they 
were in use within a security system. The damage caused to the bolt cutters during the vulnerability testing in the 
both the pilot and primary studies caused the testing to be halted, as replacement of the tools would make the 
study expensive. In addition, the financial costs to obtain the padlocks and shackles were significant for a study 
of this size and evaluation of more expensive security equipment could put studies one out of reach for most 
institutions. 
 
The analysis of the post testing interview responses demonstrated that 80 percent of the participants thought that 
combining the two testing methods for each evaluation and developing a comprehensive evaluation model could, 
and should, be done. This view was reflected by the relationship between the testing results. The laboratory 
testing results indicated that Padlock B was stronger than Padlock A and the experts interviewed also recognised 
the significance of that relationship, especially when it was reflected in the vulnerability testing results. Those 
results indicated that Padlock B provided more delay against the bolt cutter attacks. Therefore, the relationships 
between expert opinion and the testing results support the amalgamation of both methods of testing for security 
equipment evaluations.  
 
The similarity between both the pilot and primary study results indicated that the methods used were reliable. 
The laboratory testing results demonstrated comparatively low standard deviations over the whole testing series. 
The vulnerability testing for both studies had a failure of the bolt cutters, indicating a trend in the overuse of the 
equipment. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The data and analysis from this study can be used to make several recommendations for security equipment 
evaluations. The relationships between vulnerability testing and laboratory testing are complimentary, rather 
than predictive, meaning that where applicable evaluations should incorporate both types of testing. Such a 
model would use laboratory testing to ascertain if the equipment meets an industry or standards benchmark. 
Vulnerability testing can then explore and identify any other weaknesses in the equipment. Such an approach 
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could ensure that evaluated equipment is statistically reliable, environmentally fit-for-purpose and mitigates 
against expected threats. 
 
The study confirmed that the level of security vulnerability was affected if equipment has been evaluated. The 
Padlock A demonstrated properties equivalent to AS4145.4-2002 physical security grade SP8 and Padlock B 
grade SP7. The higher grade achieved by Padlock A in the laboratory tests correlated with a higher delay factor 
in vulnerability testing. Many standards that deal with security equipment focus solely on laboratory testing, as it 
is easier to conduct and provides quantitative results. However, the introduction of vulnerability testing to many 
of these standards could improve the resistance of security equipment to evolving and original attack methods. 
 
As the study has demonstrated with the sample padlocks, laboratory evaluation allowed isolated tests of system 
components, in a time and cost efficiency manner. Such testing resulted in a reliable and valid quantitative data 
set that could be applied to other similar product. Whereas vulnerability testing allowed the many individual 
components to be tested as a holistic system, directed by the attackers capabilities. By combining the two 
evaluation methods in a formal methodology, more robust security systems that are relevant to the assessed 
threats may be designed, applied and managed. Such an approach was supported by Jones and Smith in their two 
level security equipment evaluation model that applied a controlled laboratory environment and a simulated 
vulnerability test (2005, p. 24). 
 
Finally, such testing provides a scientific approach to security evaluation, where reliability and validity are 
considered and applied. As Armstrong suggests, repetition of both laboratory testing and vulnerability attacks 
will offer a much more accurate and valid set of obtained results (2005, p. 3). Such an approach allows the 
design and application of security systems, with a known and measurable weakness of each single component 
leading to an understanding of the whole system. A systems approach allows a quantitative measure of system 
performance to be defined, where continuous measures can be applied and monitoring reduces entropic security 
decay (Coole & Brooks, 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has presented a study that attempted to define what approach may be the most effective when 
evaluating either a facility wide security system or security components, devices or elements. Such evaluations 
should result in a reduction in system vulnerabilities, gained by better understanding and application of 
equipment into a system. The study considered two evaluation methods, namely laboratory testing and 
vulnerability testing, applied to security padlocks. Evaluation tests provided data that were used to establish the 
relationships between laboratory and vulnerability testing in security equipment evaluations. Although analysis 
of comparative effectiveness is to some degree a subjective process, such comparison can provide useful 
interpretation. 
 
The comparative results between the laboratory and vulnerability tests demonstrated a strong correlation 
between high levels of resistance to laboratory testing and subsequent reduced equipment vulnerability. The 
vulnerability attacks were effectively defeated, due to the strength of the security padlocks. Such results 
indicated that the design of security equipment to a priori laboratory testing standard would reduce vulnerability 
levels, provide quantitative data for other similar security equipment and both methodologies of testing are 
complementary. In addition, such evaluation allows more effectively designed and applied facility wide security 
systems. 
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